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SI-1 Proofs
We first state and prove the following Lemma employed in many of the subsequent proofs.
Lemma 9 The function G (φd (cL, cW )) − G (φnd (cL, cW )) is decreasing in cW when F (·)
and G (·) are uniform.
Proof: With G (·) uniform it sufficies to show φd (cL, cW )− φnd (cL, cW ) is decreasing in
cW . The function φd (cL, cW ) may be rewritten as
φnd (cL,cW )
P (x ∈ [cW , H] |x > cW ) + (E [x |x ∈ [cW , H]]− E [x |x ∈ [cL, cW ]]) ,
and with substitution and algebra φd (cL, cW )− φnd (cL, cW ) may be rewritten as
P (x > H |x > cW ) · (H − E [x |x ∈ [cW , H]]) + (E [x |x ∈ [cW , H]]− E [x |x ∈ [cL, cW ]]) .
Now for F (·) uniform H − E [x |x ∈ [cW , H]] =
(
x¯
2
) · P (x ∈ [cW , H]). Substituting back in
and simplifying we then have that φd (cL, cW )− φnd (cL, cW ) =( x¯
2
)
·P (x > H) (1− P (x > H |x > cW ))+(E [x |x ∈ [cW , H]]− E [x |x ∈ [cL, cW ]]) which →
∂
∂cW
(φd (cL, cW )− φnd (cL, cW )) = −
( x¯
2
)
· P (x > H) f (cW )
P (x > cW )
P (x > H |x > cW )
+
∂
∂cW
(E [x |x ∈ [cW , H]]− E [x |x ∈ [cL, cW ]])
= −
( x¯
2
)
· f (cW ) · [P (x > H |x > cW )]2 < 0
since ∂
∂cW
(E [x |x ∈ [cW , H]]) = ∂∂cW (E [x |x ∈ [cL, cW ]]) for the uniform. 
Proof of Lemma 1 As described in the beginning of Section 3 and footnote 4, in the main
text we restrict attention to equilibria where dissent increases the probability of review – in
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other words, where φd > φnd. However, there sometimes exists a second more fragile class of
equilibria with a different structure, in which “dissent” decreases the probability of review
(i.e. φnd > φd) because it signals that noncompliance occured but that it was relatively
minor. Such “dissents” are more easily interpeted as “concurrences.” Below we prove a more
general statement about the form of all equilibria; Lemma 1 is a straightforward corollary
of this more general statement.
Lemma 10 All equilibria are in cutpoint strategies (c∗L, c
∗
W , φ
∗
s, φ
∗
ns) with c
∗
L ∈ [L,H] and
c∗W < H. There are two types of equilibria.
• In a dissent equilibrium,
– The lower court L rules liberally for x ≥ c∗L and conservatively otherwise.
– The potential whistleblower W never dissents following a conservative ruling, and
issues a costly dissent following a liberal ruling whenever the facts are sufficiently
conservative (x ≤ c∗W ).
– The higher court H never reviews conservative rulings, and sometimes reviews
liberal rulings. Specifically, he reviews a liberal ruling i.f.f. k ≤ φ∗s when W
dissents, and i.f.f. k ≤ φ∗ns < φ∗s when W does not dissent.
• In a concurrence equilibrium,
– The lower court L rules liberally for x ≥ c∗L and conservatively otherwise.
– The potential whistleblower W never concurs with a conservative ruling, and issues
a costly concurrence following a liberal ruling when the facts are in x ∈ [c∗W , H].
– The higher court H never reviews conservative rulings, and sometimes reviews
liberal rulings. Specifically, he reviews a liberal ruling i.f.f. k ≤ φ∗ns when W fails
to concur, and i.f.f. k ≤ φ∗s < φ∗ns when W concurs. 
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Proof: The interpretation of the costly signal is dependent on equilibrium. Specifically,
it can either signal that the case facts are more conservative – in which case it is interpreted
as a dissent – or it can signal that the case facts are more liberal – in which case it is
interpreted as a concurrence. In the former instance it raises the probability of review, while
in the latter instance it lowers it. Thus, we denote the whistleblower’s actions using the
agnostic label j ∈ {s, ns} – that is, she either issued the costly signal or she did not.
When H is called to play he is the final mover, and the history h ∈ {lib, con} × {s, ns}
can take four possible values. For each history he calculates a net gain from review that is
derived using Bayes’ rule and the other players’ strategies – denote this net gain φi,j where
i denotes the ruling and j denotes the signal value. Because H is the last mover, his best-
response takes the form of a cutpoint for each history – he reviews i.f.f k < φi,j, where k is
the cost of review.
Now consider the whistleblower W . If faced with a compliant ruling of either lib or con
she will never send the costly signal, since the ruling will stand whether or not H reviews.
Now suppose she is faced with a noncompliant ruling of lib. If she issues the costly signal
then she will pay an up front cost of d. If the signal raises the chance of review (φl,s > φl,ns)
then her net gain will be
(G (φl,s)−G (φl,ns)) · ((W − x)− αε) ,
since whenever k ∈ (φl,s, φl,ns) the signal results in a review and a reversal that otherwise
would not have occurred. If the signal lowers the chance of review (φl,s < φl,ns) then her net
gain will be
(G (φl,ns)−G (φl,s)) · ((x−W ) + αε) ,
since whenever k ∈ (φl,ns, φl,s) the signal prevents a review and reversal that would otherwise
have occured. Recalling that she will never dissent on a compliant liberal ruling, her best
response is either to signal when
x < min
{
(W − αε)− d
G (φl,s)−G (φl,ns) , H
}
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if the signal increases review, or to signal when
x ∈
[
(W − αε) + d
G (φl,s)−G (φl,ns) , H
]
if the signal decreases review. Thus, her strategy takes the desired forms.
Now consider the lower court L. It is strictly dominant to rule compliantly when it and
the higher court agree (x < L or x > H) since this ensures its desired outcome and there is
no chance of being reversed (even upon review). For cases within x ∈ [L,H] it is always
the case that ruling liberally elicits a higher probability of review when x < c∗W than when
x > c∗W . If φs > φns then W signals when x < c
∗
W , (thereby raising the probabiliy of review)
and if φns > φs then W fails to signal when x < c
∗
W (also raising the probability of review).
Consequently, L must also play a cutpoint strategy c∗L; if it is unwilling to comply on some x
then it is also unwiling to comply on some x′ > x where the benefits of the liberal outcome
are greater and the probability of review is (weakly) lower.
Finally, because L always rules lib when x > H, any conservative ruling must be com-
pliant. Since W never signals on a compliant ruling, PBE requires that φc,ns = 0; that is,
H evaluates the net gain of reviewing a conservative ruling without a signal to be 0 and
never reviews it. A conservative ruling accompanied by a costly signal is off-path – in PBE
φc,s is unrestricted, and the value will generate some off-path best response behavior for
the whistleblower when she observes a noncompliant conservative ruling (x > H). However,
choosing these pairs arbitrarily does not perturb equilibrium because ruling lib is stricty
dominant for L whenever x > H and a conservative ruling would be noncompliant; thus we
leave these values unspecified. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemmas 2 – 5 Lemmas 2 – 4 follow immediately from the in-text analysis.
The necessary and sufficient condition for cutpoints (c∗L, c
∗
W , φ
∗
nd, φ
∗
d) to be an equilibrium in
Lemma 5 is a straightforward assembly of the best-response characterizations in the preceding
Lemmas; that is, strategies are an equilibrium if and only if every player is best-responding
down every path of play given the strategies of the other players. A more explicit statement
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of the assembled necessary and sufficient conditions is included below for clarity.
1. φ∗d = φd (cL,max {cW , cL}) and φ∗nd = φnd (cL,max {cW , cL})
(higher court best-response)
2. c∗W = min {cW (φ∗d, φ∗nd) , H}
(whistleblower best-response)
3. c∗L = cL (c
∗
W , φ
∗
d, φ
∗
nd)
(lower court best-response). 
Proof of Proposition 1 The proof proceeds in two parts. First, we show that the bench-
marks cL and cL exist, are unique, and satisfy L < cL < cL < H. Second, we prove the main
body of the statement.
Part 1
The cutpoint cL solves cL = x
∗ (G (φnd (cL, cL))) and the cutpoint cL solves cL = x∗ (G (φd (cL, cL))).
Using the definitions of φd (·), φnd (·), x∗ (·), and that G (0) = 0, it is easily verified that the
right hand sides of both equalities are (1) greater than L when cL = L, (2) equal to L when
cL = H, and (3) strictly decreasing in cL. Thus, both have a unique solution interior to
(L,H). Finally, to see that cL > cL it suffices to observe that φd (cL, cL) > φnd (cL, cL) ∀cL
and x∗ (G (φ)) is decreasing in φ.
Although the following is inessential to the proof, we now also briefly explain why cL
and cL are the unique equilibrium levels of compliance in the no information and complete
information 2 player games, respectively.
In the no information game absent the whistleblower, the higher court will use a single
threshold φ for reviewing a liberal disposition, and this threshold must equal the expected
benefit of review given his beliefs about the lower court’s behavior. Applying the analysis
in Section 3.3, the lower court must use a compliance cutpoint cL = x
∗ (G (φ)) in a best
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response. Given a cutpoint strategy by the lower court, the higher court must believe upon
observing a liberal disposition that the case facts are x > cL; it is easily verified that the net
benefit of review under these circumstances is equal to φnd (cL, cL). Combining these two
best response conditions yields the equilibrium condition cL = x
∗ (G (φnd (cL, cL))).
In the complete information game the higher court observes the case facts to be x. Her
expected benefit of reviewing and reversing the case, should the lower court rule noncom-
pliantly, is equal to H − x = φd (x, x). Thus, she will review and reverse a noncompliant
liberal ruling with probability G (φd (x, x)). The lower court’s net gain from noncompliance
is (1−G (φd (x, x))) (x− L) and the cost is G (φd (x, x)) · ε. The net gain is increasing and
equal to 0 at x = L, and the cost is decreasing and equal to 0 at x = H; hence there is a
unique interior cutpoint cˆL below which the lower court will comply and above which she
will not, which satisfies
(1−G (φd (cˆL, cˆL))) (cˆL − L) = G (φd (cˆL, cˆL)) · ε ⇐⇒ cˆL = x∗ (G (φd (cˆL, cˆL))) ,
which is the definition of c¯L
Part 2
We seek to characterize a partial equilibrium (c∗L, φ
∗
nd, φ
∗
d) where the lower and higher
courts are best responding to each other and the whistleblower, and the whistleblower’s
strategy is to use a dissent cutpoint of cW . In other words, we seek values of (c
∗
L, φ
∗
nd, φ
∗
d)
that jointly satisfy Lemmas 2 and 4 given cW .
By substituting the best-response conditions for the higher court into the best response
condition for the lower court, we derive the following necessary and sufficient condition for
existence of a partial equilibrium with compliance level cL:
cL = min {x∗ (G (φd (cL,max {cW , cL}))) ,max {x∗ (G (φnd (cL,max {cW , cL}))) , cW}} (7)
The right hand side of the above is a function of cL and cW , and we henceforth denote
it cˆL (cL; cW ). Intuitively, cˆL (cL; cW ) is the lower court’s best response cutpoint when the
higher court believes it to be using cutpoint cL, and everybody believes the whistleblower
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to be using cutpoint cW .
14 A partial equilibrium level of compliance is a fixed point of this
function.
We now show that for every cW there exists a unique value of cL satisfying the equality in
(7), and that value is equal to the cutpoint c∗L (cL) described in the Proposition. First, using
the definitions of φd (·), φnd (·), x∗ (·), and that G (0) = 0, the following facts about the r.h.s.
of the equality are easily verified: (1) it is weakly decreasing in cL (since it is the middle
value of three weakly decreasing functions), 2) c∗L (L, cW ) > L, and 3) c
∗
L (H, cW ) = L. This
establishes that there is a unique solution interior to (L,H).
For the next steps also recall that cL = x
∗ (G (φnd (cL, cL))) and cL = x
∗ (G (φd (cL, cL))).
Region 1 : To see that cL = cˆL (cL; cW ) when cW < cL, note that the latter implies
cˆL (cL, cW ) = min {x∗ (G (φd (cL, cL))) ,max {x∗ (G (φnd (cL, cL))) , cW}}
= min {x∗ (G (φd (cL, cL))) ,max {cL, cW}} = cL
Intuitively, when cW is less than the cutpoint cL that the lower court would use absent the
whistleblower, then the lower court’s partial equilibrium compliance cutpoint is the same as
absent W – the whistleblower never dissents on path, absent dissents the higher court draws
the same inference as he would absent the whistleblower, and so the lower court complies to
the same degree. In this case, the degree of compliance is constant in cW and equal to cL,
the probability of review after dissent is G (φd (cL, cL)) and also constant, and the probability
of dissent is 0 (since cW < cL).
Region 2 : To see that c∗L (cW ) = cW ⇐⇒ cW = cˆL (cW , cW ) when cW ∈ [cL, cL], note
that the latter implies (from the definitions of cL and cL) that cW > x
∗ (G (φnd (cW , cW )))
and that cW < x
∗ (G (φd (cW , cW ))). Hence,
cˆL (cW ; cW ) = min {x∗ (G (φd (cW , cW ))) ,max {x∗ (G (φnd (cW , cW ))) , cW}} = cW .
Intuitively, suppose cW ∈ [cL, cL] and the lower court were to comply exactly up to cW . A
14Note that cW is a complete contingent description of how W would behave after a liberal ruling on any
case x ∈ X. L cannot “change cW ” off-equilibrium path. Rather, L’s ruling, combined with the case facts,
determine whether or not W dissents based on cW . If, for example, W and L’s strategies are described
by cutpoints L < cL < cW < H, then W ’s strategy specifies precisely what would happen if L were to go
“off-path” by ruling liberally on a case x ∈ [L, cL] – it would trigger a dissent.
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dissent would perfectly signal that the case facts were at cW , and thus L would want to
comply for all x < cW since cW is less than the cutpoint c¯L it would use if H were perfectly
informed about the case facts. Conversely, the absence of dissent would signal that x > cW ;
since L would not comply on such cases if H drew the inference that x ∈ [cL, H], she also
would not comply when H draws the weaker inference that x ∈ [cW , H]. Consequently, L’s
best response cutpoint is exactly at cˆL (cW ) = cW and we have a partial equilibrium. In this
region, compliance is clearly increasing since it is equal to cW , and the probability of review
after dissent is G (φd (cW , cW )) = G (H − cW ) which is also decreasing in cW .
Region 3 : Suppose that cW > cL and denote c
d
L (cW ) as the value of cL that solves
cL = x
∗ (G (φd (cL, cW ))). It is easily verified using steps identical to those for cL and cL
that cdL (cW ) is unique, well defined, and in (L,H). We now wish to prove that cW >
cL → cdL (cW ) = cˆL
(
cdL (cW ) , cW
)
, meaning that the partial equilibrium compliance cutpoint
is exactly cdL (cW ). First, note that cL = x
∗ (G (φd (cL, cL))) → cL > x∗ (G (φd (cL, cW )))
for cW > c¯L (since x
∗ (G (φd (cL, cW ))) is decreasing in cW ). This then implies that the
solution to cdL (cW ) = x
∗ (G (φd (cdL (cW ) , cW ))) is < cL < cW . Now from the defini-
tion of cˆL (cL;cW ), the lower court’s best response cutpoint for any (cL, cW ) such that
cW > x
∗ (G (φd (cL,max {cW , cL}))) is equal to x∗ (G (φd (cL,max {cW , cL}))); thus, the best
response cutpoint to
(
cdL (cW ) , cW
)
is cdL (cW ) and we have a partial equilibrium.
To see the comparative statics, first note cdL (cW ) = x
∗ (G (φd (cdL (cW ) , cW ))) is decreas-
ing in cW since φd (·) is decreasing in cW , G (φ) is increasing in φ, and x∗ (q) is increas-
ing in q. The probability of dissent F (cW ) − F
(
cdL (cW )
)
is then increasing in cW since
cdL (cW ) is decreasing in cW . Finally, to see that the probability of review given dissent
G
(
φd
(
cdL (cW ) , cW
))
is decreasing in cW , implicitly differentiate the definition to get,
∂
∂cW
(
cdL (cW )
)
=
∂x∗
(
G
(
φd
(
cdL (cW ) , cW
)))
∂q
· ∂
∂cW
(
G
(
φd
(
cdL (cW ) , cW
)))
Since ∂x
∗(·)
∂q
> 0, ∂
∂cW
(
G
(
φd
(
cdL (cW ) , cW
)))
inherits the sign of ∂
∂cW
(
cdL (cW )
)
which as
previously shown is negative. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
Part 1 - Equilibrium Characterization and Existence
A necessary and sufficient condition for a profile of cutpoints (c∗L, c
∗
W , φ
∗
nd, φ
∗
d) to be an
equilibrium of the complete model is that they jointly satisfy Lemmas 2 – 4. By Proposi-
tion 1, if the whistleblower uses cutpoint cW then equilibrium requires that c
∗
L = c
∗
L (cW )
(which is uniquely defined) and thus that φ∗d = φd (c
∗
L (cW ) ,max {c∗L (cW ) , cW}) and φ∗nd =
φnd (c
∗
L (cW ) ,max {c∗L (cW ) , cW}), which are also uniquely defined. Because the necessary
values of the other players strategies in an equilibrium are uniquely pinned down for every
cW , we can substitute these values into the whistleblower’s best response characterization in
Lemma 3 to yield a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of an equilibrium with
whistleblowing cutpoint cW :
cW = min {cW (φd (c∗L (cW ) ,max {c∗L (cW ) , cW}) , φnd (c∗L (cW ) ,max {c∗L (cW ) , cW})) , H} .
Observe that the right hand side is a function of cW alone, and we henceforth denote
it cˆW (cW ). Equilibrium values of cW are fixed points of this function; the equilibrium
condition in the main text is identical except with the definition of cW (φd, φnd) substituted in.
Intuitively, cˆW (cW ) is the whistleblower’s best response cutpoint when the lower and higher
court believe her to be using cutpoint cW , and play their corresponding partial equilibrium
strategies.
Existence of an equilibrium whistleblowing cutpoint satisfying cW = cˆW (cW ) that is ≤ H
(and hence an equilibrium of the complete model) then follows immediately from the fact
that cˆW (cW ) ≤ H ∀cW .
Part 2 - Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Whistlebower Effects
It is helpful to more-explicitly write the definition of cˆW (cW ) by substituting in the
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partial equilibrium values of the lower court’s compliance c∗L (cW ). We have that
cˆW (cW ) =

min
{
(W − αε)− d
G(φd(cL,cL))−G(φnd(cL,cL)) , H
}
for cW ≤ cL.
min
{
(W − αε)− d
G(φd(cW ,cW ))−G(φnd(cW ,cW )) , H
}
for cW ∈ [cL, cL]
min
{
(W − αε)− d
G(φd(c∗L(cW ),cW ))−G(φnd(c∗L(cW ),cW ))
, H
}
for cW ≥ cL
In the main proof we employ the following useful properties of cˆW (cW ). First, it is constant
for cW ≤ cL. Second, it is weakly decreasing for cW ∈ [cL, cL], and strictly decreasing if
cˆW (cW ) < H. Third, cˆW (cL) ≥ cˆW (cW ) for any cW > cL.
To show these properties, first notice that cW only affects cˆW (cW ) through the de-
nominator of the fraction in the first term – this is the probability that dissent is piv-
otal for review given cutpoint cW . Now, the first property is immediate from the defi-
nition. To prove the second and third properties, we argue as an intermediate step that
G (φd (cL, cW ))−G (φnd (cL, cW )) > G (φd (c′L, c′W ))−G (φnd (c′L, c′W )) for c′L > cL, c′W > cW ,
cL ≤ cW and c′L ≤ c′W . This is because
G (φd (cL, cW ))−G (φnd (cL, cW )) > G (φd (cL, c′W ))−G (φnd (cL, c′W )) (by Lemma 9)
> G (φd (c
′
L, c
′
W ))−G (φnd (c′L, c′W )) (by definitions)
This then implies both that G (φd (cW , cW )) − G (φnd (cW , cW )) is strictly decreasing for
cW ∈ [cL, cL] (implying the second property) and that G (φd (cL, cL)) − G (φnd (cL, cL)) >
G (φd (c
∗
L (cW ) , cW ))−G (φnd (c∗L (cW ) , cW )) for cW > cL (implying the third property).
We now proceed to the main proof. By the definition of c∗L (cW ), whistleblower effects –
that is, greater compliance than cL – occur in an equilibrium if and only if the equilibrium
whistleblowing cutpoint c∗W is > cL. To show that the desired condition is necessary and
sufficient, it then suffices to show that (1) if it fails all equilibrium whistleblowing cutpoints
are ≤ cL, and (2) if it holds there exists an equilibrium whistleblowing cutpoint > cL.
(Necessity). If the condition fails, then H > cL > (W − αε)− dG(φd(cL,cL))−G(φnd(cL,cL)) which
implies that cL > cˆW (cL). Since cˆW (cL) ≥ cˆW (cW ) ∀cW > cˆW (cL), there are no equilibrium
whistleblowing cutpoints greater than cL and hence no equilibria with whistleblower effects.
(Sufficiency) If the condition holds then (W − αε) − d
G(φd(cL,cL))−G(φnd(cL,cL)) < cL < H
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which implies that cL < cˆW (cL). Since cˆW (cL) is constant for cW < cL, this implies that
all equilibrium whistleblowing cutpoints c∗W are > cL. Consequently, all equilibria exhibit
whistleblower effects (which is in fact stronger than the desired property). 
Proof of Lemma 6 For the purposes of this proof it is helpful to explicitly express the de-
pendence of the best response mapping on the whistleblower’s parameters, i.e. cˆW (cW ;W,d, α).
Several substantively unimportant subtleties are now worth noting. First, the mapping from
the parameter space to maximum equilibrium compliance c˜L (W,d, α) is not necessarily con-
tinuous. Second, in the comparative statics for each parameter (W,d, α) there need not
always be a region with partial and strictly diminishing whistleblower effects. Instead, the
region with full whistleblower effects may jump to one with partial whistleblower effects
where compliance is constant. Third, the regions may be truncated for the cost of dissent d
because it cannot fall below 0;15 for example, if W = L and α = 0, then there would be no
whistleblower effects in a dissent equilibrium for any feasible value of d ≥ 0.
In this proof we formally describe the steps for the parameter W ; steps for d, α are
the same except the order of the regions is reversed (and thus identical for −d and −α)
with the understanding that the parameter space for d is truncated. The proof proceeds in
three parts. First, we show that when there are multiple equilibria the compliance maxi-
mizing equilibrium is the one with the lowest cW ; we denote this whistleblowing cutpoint
c˜W (W,d, α) = min {cW : cW = cˆW (cW ;W,d, α)}. Hence, maximum equilibrium compliance
c˜L (W,d, α) is equal to the composite mapping c
∗
L (c˜W (W,d, α)). Second, we prove several
properties of c˜W (W,d, α). Third, we apply parts 1 and 2 to show the desired result.
Part 1
We argue that when there are multiple equilibria, the compliance maximizing equilibrium
is the one with the lowest c∗W . Intuitively, this holds because to sustain a higher equilibrium
whistleblowing cutpoint, the whistleblower’s probability of being pivotal must be higher,
15This is not an assumption but an observation; if dissent in the literal real-world sense were beneficial
rather than costly, then choosing not to dissent would be the costly signal of “dissent” in the model.
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and since more whistleblowing reduces the probability of being pivotal ceteris paribus, this
necessarily requires less compliance.
Recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that cˆW (cW ;W,d, α) is constant over cW ≤ cL and
larger at cL than at any cW > cL. As a result, there cannot be multiple equilibria where one
exhibits no whistleblower effects and others do—either there is a unique equilibrium with
no whistleblower effects (c∗W ≤ cL) or there are one or more equilibria all of which exhibit
whistleblower effects (c∗W > cL).
Now, if there are two equilibria with whistleblower effects cˆ∗W > c
∗
W > cL, then by
definition,
c∗W = min
{
(W − αε)− d
G (φd (c∗L (c
∗
W ) , c
∗
W ))−G (φnd (c∗L (c∗W ) , c∗W ))
, H
}
and
cˆ∗W = min
{
(W − αε)− d
G (φd (c∗L (cˆ
∗
W ) , cˆ
∗
W ))−G (φnd (c∗L (cˆ∗W ) , cˆ∗W ))
, H
}
This implies that,
G (φd (c
∗
L (cˆ
∗
W ) , cˆ
∗
W ))−G (φnd (c∗L (cˆ∗W ) , cˆ∗W )) > G (φd (c∗L (c∗W ) , c∗W ))−G (φnd (c∗L (c∗W ) , c∗W )) ,
which in turn could only be true if c∗L (cˆ
∗
W ) < c
∗
L (c
∗
W ), since by Lemma 9 the difference
G (φd (cL, cW ))−G (φnd (cL, cW )) is decreasing in cW . This shows the desired property.
Part 2
We now show that c˜W (W,d, α) satisfies the following three properties:
1. it is weakly increasing in W
2. for any value of c∗W ∈ [−∞, c¯L], there ∃ a unique W ∗ s.t. c˜W (W ∗, d, α) = c∗W
3. there ∃W s.t. c˜W (W,d, α) = H
To see (1) consider two values of the whistleblower W ′ > W . By definition of c˜W (W,d, α),
any value of cW < c˜W (W,d, α) is also less than cˆW (cW ;W,d, α) (because it is less than the
lowest fixed point). Since cˆW (cW ;W,d, α) is increasing in W , this furthermore implies that
any value of cW < c˜W (W,d, α) is also less than cˆW (cW ;W
′, d, α). Thus, the lowest fixed
point c˜W (W
′, d, α) for W ′ must be ≥ the lowest fixed point c˜W (W,d, α) for W .
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To see (2), it is easy to verify from the equilibrium definition in Proposition 2 that for
any value of c∗W < H there is a unique W
∗ s.t. c∗W is an equilibrium whisteblowing cutpoint.
However, this is not enough to show that c˜W (W
∗, d, α) = c∗W , i.e., that c
∗
W is the lowest
equilibrium whistleblowing cutpoint for W ∗. We now show this property must also hold for
any c∗W ≤ c¯L. To do so, it suffices to recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that the best-
response mapping cˆW (cW ;W,d, α) is weakly decreasing for cW ≤ c¯L. Consequently, there is
at most one fixed point ≤ c¯L, so if such an equilibrium exists it must be the lowest one.
To see (3), observe that the probability dissent is pivotalG (φd (c
∗
L (cW ) , cW ))−G (φnd (c∗L (cW ) , cW ))
is > G (φd (c¯L, H)) − G (φnd (c¯L, H)) > 0 by c∗L (cW ) ≤ c¯L and Lemma 9. Thus, for any
whistleblower W such that,
(W − αε)− d
G (φd (c¯L, H))−G (φnd (c¯L, H)) > H
the best response mapping cˆW (cW ;W,d, α) is also > H for any cW , and consequently the
unique equilibrium involves whistleblowing cutpoint c∗W = H.
Part 3
The properties proved in Part 2 jointly imply that (1) c˜W (W, d, α) is first strictly increas-
ing, continuous in W , and onto [−∞, cL] (2) beyond c¯L the function continues to increase
(but potentially discontinuously) until it reaches H, and (3) it is constant thereafter. Conse-
quently, maximum equilibrium compliance c∗L (c˜W (W,d, α)) exhibits the regions as described
mirroring the regions of cW – first with no whistleblower effects, followed by continuously
increasing whistleblower effects up to c¯L, followed by (potentially discontinuously decreasing)
partial whistleblower effects, and finally constant and partial whistleblower effects when W
is fully reporting all instances of noncompliance. Properties and analysis are identical for
(−α,−d) except that for d the regions may be truncated from the top.
Proof of Lemma 7 The proof proceeds in two parts. First, we characterize H’s expected
utility as a function of the whistleblower’s cutpoint cW in a partial equilibrium, as well as
the derivative of that utility. Second, we use this analysis to prove the main results.
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Part 1
In Region I of Proposition 1, H’s expected utility as a function of cW is constant since
c∗L (cW ) = cL and dissent is off path. In Regions II and III H’s complete expected utility,
taking into account his review costs, is the expression:∫ c∗L(cW )
−∞
(
H − x
2
)
f (x) dx+
∫ ∞
H
∫ φnd(c∗L(cW ),cW )
0
−kg (k) dkf (x) dx
+
∫ cW
c∗L(cW )
(∫ φd(c∗L(cW ),cW )
0
((
H − x
2
)
− k
)
g (k) dk +
∫ ∞
φd(c∗L(cW ),cW )
(
x−H
2
)
g (k) dk
)
f (x) dx
+
∫ H
cW
(∫ φnd(c∗L(cW ),cW )
0
((
H − x
2
)
− k
)
g (k) dk +
∫ ∞
φnd(c∗L(cW ),cW )
(
x−H
2
)
g (k) dk
)
f (x) dx
This expression has a simple and easily interpretable derivative in the whistleblower’s cut-
point cW which is derived using Leibniz rule and canceling:(
∂c∗L (cW )
cW
)
f (c∗L (cW ))
(∫ φd(c∗L(cW ),cW )
0
kg (k) + (1−G (φd (·))) (H − c∗L (cW ))
)
+f (cW )
(∫ φd(c∗L(cW ),cW )
φnd(c∗L(cW ),cW )
((H − cW )− k) g (k) dk
)
. (8)
The first line is the net gain resulting from the change in L’s compliance behavior c∗L (cW ).
It is the product of three subterms: 1) the density f (c∗L (cW )) of cases at the compliance
cutpoint, 2) the marginal change
∂c∗L(cW )
cW
in the compliance cutpoint, and 3) the marginal
benefit
∫ φd(c∗L(cW ),cW )
0 kg (k)+(1−G (φd (·))) (H − c∗L (cW )) of switching from noncompliance
to compliance at case x = c∗L (cW ). (This is because when k < φd (c
∗
L (cW ) , cW ) the outcome
doesn’t change but H saves the review cost, while when k > φd (c
∗
L (cW ) , cW ) H would not
have reviewed either way but now gets a compliant outcome for free.)
The second line is the net gain or loss from the whistleblower sending the costly rather
than free signal at case x = cW , which results in H inferring that x is in [cL, cW ] rather
than [cW , x¯]. This net gain is comprised of the density of cases f (cW ) at the whistleblowing
cutpoint, times the net benefit of obtaining the conservative outcome through a review when
k ∈ [φnd (·) , φd (·)].
Part 2
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We now show that the utility-maximizing whistleblowing cutpoint for H is strictly less
than H and weakly greater than L; we do so by showing that the derivative is < 0 at H and
> 0 at cW ∈ (cL, cL).
At cW = H we have
∂c∗L(cW )
cW
∣∣∣
cW=H
< 0 (so the first term is negative) and the second term
reduces to −f (cW )
∫ φd(c∗L(H),H)
φnd(c∗L(H),H)
kg (k) dk < 0. Intuitively, complete reporting of noncom-
pliance is both costly in terms of compliance, and more reporting than H wants even absent
the compliance effect.
For cW ∈ (cL, cL) we have c∗L (cW ) = cW and the derivative simplifies to,
f (cW )
(∫ φnd(cW ,cW )
0
kg (k) dk +
∫ ∞
φnd(cW ,cW )
(H − cW )
)
> 0.
Intuitively, more whistleblowing is all gain since it converts the marginal case from one where
the lower court is compliant only when reviewed, to one on which the lower court complies
for sure. Thus, the utility maximizing cutpoint is ≥ c¯L. 
Proof of Lemma 8 Recall from the analysis in the proof of Lemma 7 that H’s preferences
for changes in the whistleblower’s cutpoint cW involves a trade off between the equilibrium
compliance cost of more whistleblowing against the marginal informational benefit.
From equation (8), this marginal informational benefit (henceforth “MIB”) is equal to,
f (cW )
(∫ φd(c∗L(cW ),cW )
φnd(c∗L(cW ),cW )
((H − cW )− k) g (k) dk
)
The proof requires two substeps. First, we show that the MIB satisfies a single crossing
property and is equal to 0 at some unique c∗∗W ∈ (c¯L, H). Second, we show that the equilibrium
of the game where the whistleblower is a perfect agent who internalizes H’s review costs
involves that whistleblower using cutpoint c∗∗W , and the higher and lower courts jointly best
responding exactly as in the baseline model. These two properties then jointly imply that at
the unique equilibrium with a perfect agent, the whistleblower’s cutpoint is strictly greater
than the cutpoint maximizing H’s utility. The reason is that a necessary condition for
some cˆW to maximize H’s utility (from eqn. 8) is for the MIB be equal to the marginal
compliance cost. Since the marginal compliance cost is always strictly positive in Region III,
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at the utility maximizing cˆW the MIB must also be strictly positive, so cˆW must be strictly
less than c∗∗W .
Intuitively, a “clone” of H as whistleblower dissents too much because – lacking commit-
ment power and responding to her interim incentives – she only takes into account the MIB
of more whistleblowing and not the marginal compliance cost. (A clone who could commit
ex-ante to her whistleblowing behavior would indeed induce the optimum for H).
Part 1
From the proof in Lemma 7, recall that the MIB is positive in Region II and negative at
cW = H. In Region III it can be rewritten as,(
φd (·)− φnd (·)
x¯k¯
)
·
(
(H − cW )− φd (c
∗
L (cW ) , cW ) + φnd (c
∗
L (cW ) , cW )
2
)
To show this satisfies a single crossing property it suffices to show that the second term is
decreasing in cW , which can be written as,
1
2
(((H − cW )− φd (c∗L (cW ) , cW )) + ((H − cW )− φnd (c∗L (cW ) , cW )))
It is simple to verify that (H − cW ) − φd (c∗L (cW ) , cW ) is decreasing in cW . Hence for the
desired property it suffices to show that (H − cW ) − φnd (c∗L (cW ) , cW ) is also decreasing in
cW , which in turn holds if
∂(φnd(·))
∂cW
> −1. Taking this derivative we have
∂
∂cW
(
(H − cW )2
2 (x¯− cW )
)
= −H − cW
x¯− cW +
(H − cW )2
2 (x¯− cW ) ,
which immediately shows the desired property because H−cW
x¯−cW < 1.
Part 2
In the slightly modified game where W internalizes H’s review costs, H still uses cutpoint
strategies as in the baseline model. When φd > φnd, W ’s net benefit of dissenting on a liberal
ruling on x – conditional on that dissent being pivotal for review (i.e. k ∈ [φnd, φd] – is now
modified to be equal to ((W − x)− αε)−E [k | k ∈ [φnd, φd]], because she internalizes k. The
net cost of dissent is again d. Thus as in the baseline model W uses a cutpoint strategy of
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dissenting whenever x is less than the minimum of H and
(W − αε− E [k | k ∈ [φnd, φd]])− d
G (φd)−G (φnd)
This in turn implies that L uses a cutpoint strategy, and that the form of the equilibrium
and the partial equilibrium conditions from Proposition 1 are unchanged.
Now when W is a perfect agent in the sense of preferences, her ideal cutpoint is = H,
α = 0, and d = 0. Thus, her best response cutpoint is H − E [k | k ∈ [φnd, φd]], which must
be equal to the other players’ beliefs about it in equilibrium. Substituting in the partial
equilibrium conditions implies that a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium
with whistleblower cutpoint cW is then
H − φd (c
∗
L (cW ) , cW ) + φnd (c
∗
L (cW ) , cW )
2
= cW
⇐⇒ (H − cW )− φd (c
∗
L (cW ) , cW ) + φnd (c
∗
L (cW ) , cW )
2
= 0
which is equivalent to the condition for the MIB to be = 0. 
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SI-2 Institutional Design Analysis
In this supplemental analysis to the main text, we consider how an institutional designer
would select the parameters in the whistleblower’s utility function—her conservatism W , the
cost of dissent d, and her share of the sanction α—to maximize compliance. Compliance is
maximized when the whistleblower’s payoffs are calibrated so that dissent is attractive, but
not too attractive. Specifically, she must be willing to dissent exactly up to the intermediate
“limit to compliance” (cL) derived in Proposition 1 and no further. Any less dissenting and
compliance gains are foregone because the threat of dissent can induce more compliance.
Any more dissenting is counterproductive due to the negative equilibrium effect of reducing
the impact of dissent. The condition for dissenting precisely up to the limit cL to constitute
an equilibrium is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Holding other parameters of the model fixed, compliance by the lower court
is maximized when W , d, and α are jointly chosen so that the following equality holds:
W − αε = cL + d
G (φd (cL, cL))−G (φnd (cL, cL)) . (9)
Using Proposition 3, we can extract a number of substantively interesting results about
compliance-maximizing institutional design. We first consider how an institutional designer
with power to choose only one of the cost of dissent d, the whistleblower’s share of the
sanction α, or the whistleblower’s indifference point W , would change the parameter of
interest in response to changes in one of the other two.
Corollary 2 A compliance-maximizing institutional designer choosing d, α, or W would:
• lower the cost of dissent d if the whistleblower became more liberal or if her share of
the sanction α increased;16
• choose a more conservative whistleblower if the cost of dissent d increased or the whistle-
blower’s share of the sanction α increased;
16Unless d were already 0, in which case she would leave it there.
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• decrease the whistleblower’s share of the sanction α if the cost of dissent d increased
or the whistleblower became more liberal.
Intuitively, these comparative statics arise from the fact that decreasing the cost of dis-
sent d, decreasing the sanction share α, and increasing whistleblower’s conservatism W , are
substitutable ways of increasing the whistleblower’s willingness to dissent. Since compliance
maximization requires intermediate whistleblowing, a compliance-maximizing institutional
designer should respond to an increase in the whistleblower’s intrinsic willingness to dis-
sent by tamping down on the incentive to dissent—either by increasing the whistleblower’s
sanction share, increasing the cost of dissent, or by choosing a more liberal whistleblower.
Next, we consider how an institutional designer choosing one of d, α, or W would change
that parameter in response to changes in the lower court’s willingness to comply, either
through a change in the cost of sanction ε or the conservatism of the lower court L. The
effect of changing these latter parameters is to shift the limit to compliance (c¯L) in the
equality in equation (9).
Corollary 3 In response to an increase in the lower court’s willingness to comply—either
through an increase in the cost of sanction ε or its conservatism L—a compliance-maximizing
institutional designer should increase the incentive to dissent by:
• lowering the cost of dissent d;17
• decreasing the whistleblower’s share of the sanction α;
• choosing a more conservative whistleblower.
The corollary states that when the lower court becomes more willing to comply, a
compliance-maximizing institutional designer should adjust the whistleblower’s parameters
to further encourage dissent. This is counterintuitive: one might expect that as the lower
court’s propensity to comply increases, the need for dissent to inform the higher court of
noncompliance would decrease.
17Again, unless it were already 0 in which case she would leave it there.
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The reason for this surprising result is that the institution of dissent plays two inter-
related, but distinct, roles as a tool to increase compliance. First, it informs the higher
court that noncompliance has occurred. In this informational role, dissent is a substitute
for direct mechanisms of control like increasing sanctions or ideological alignment with the
higher court, or both. Second, because the higher court may take a costly action following a
dissent, dissent is a threat. And, as a threat, dissent can increase compliance even if it is not
carried out. But there is a limit to its ability to do so—specifically, the limit to compliance
c¯L derived in Proposition 1. The effect of increasing direct mechanisms of control such as
reversal sanctions ε and the lower court’s conservatism L is both to increase what compliance
would be absent a whistleblower (i.e. cL) and to increase the limit to dissent with a whistle-
blower (i.e. c¯L). In other words, increasing direct mechanisms of control increases both
compliance and the effectiveness of dissent as a threat for inducing even more compliance.
The compliance-maximizing institutional response is therefore to have more dissent.
Combined Proof of Proposition 3 and Corollaries 2 and 3 Maximum feasible com-
pliance in equilibrium is c¯L, and which occurs i.f.f. c
∗
W = c¯L. It is straightforward to verify
from Proposition 2 that c∗L = c
∗
W = c¯L is an equilibrium if and only if the equality in
Proposition 3 holds.
To prove the institutional design comparative statics in Corollaries 2 and 3, note first
that c¯L is a function of L and ε that is implicitly defined as cL (ε, L) = L+
ε(H−cL(L,ε))
k¯−(H−cL(L,ε)) . It
is easy to verify that c¯L (ε, L) is strictly increasing in L and ε. We now prove comparative
statics on the compliance-maximizing choice of W , which we denote W¯ (d, α, ε, L). From the
proposition, this quantity is defined as
W¯ (d, α, ε, L)− αε = c¯L (ε, L) + dk¯
φd (c¯L (ε, L) , c¯L (ε, L))− φnd (c¯L (ε, L) , c¯L (ε, L)) .
The properties in Corollary 2 clearly follow from the fact that l.h.s. is increasing in W and
decreasing in α, and the r.h.s. is increasing in d. The properties in Corollary 3 follow from
the fact that the r.h.s. is increasing in c¯L (which in turn follows from Lemma 9) and that
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c¯L (ε, L) is strictly increasing in L and ε. Nearly identical steps prove the properties for
α¯ (W,d, ε, L), the compliance-maximizing share of the sanction.
A slight wrinkle arises for the compliance-maximizing cost of dissent, since d cannot go
below 0. First we define d¯ (W,α, ε, L) to be the dissent cost satisfying
W − αε = c¯L (ε, L) + d¯ (W,α, ε, L) · k¯
φd (c¯L (ε, L) , c¯L (ε, L))− φnd (c¯L (ε, L) , c¯L (ε, L)) .
d¯ (W,α, ε, L) has straightforward comparative statics like the previous implicit characteriza-
tions. Moreover, when d¯ (W,α, ε, L) > 0 it is the compliance-maximizing dissent cost.
Next we argue that when d¯ (W,α, ε, L) < 0, the compliance-maximizing dissent cost is 0.
To see this, recall from the proof of Lemma 6 that the compliance-maximizing equilibrium
whistleblowing cutpoint c˜W (W,d, α) is decreasing in d, and the lower court’s best-response
c∗L (cW ) is increasing in cW when cW < c¯L. Hence, to show that increasing d above 0 decreases
maximum equilibrium compliance only requires showing that c˜W (W, 0, α) < c¯L. This follows
from the observations that 1) c˜W (W, 0, α) = W − αε, and 2) d¯ (W,α, ε, L) < 0 implies that
W − αε < c¯L (ε, L).
Finally, since the compliance-maximizing dissent cost is max
{
0, d¯ (W,α, ε, L)
}
, and the
function d¯ (W,α, ε, L) satisfies the desired monotone comparative statics, max
{
0, d¯ (W,α, ε, L)
}
must also (weakly) satisfy them. 
21
